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ABSTRACT
This case concerns the meaning disability-related-discrimination. It centred on the housing or ‘premises’ provisions of
the Disability  Discrimination  Act  1995  (DDA  1995),  but  this  House  of  Lords’  judgment,  overruling  the  long-
established Clark v Novacold [1999] ICR 951, CA, is of great significance to the Act’s coverage  of  employment  and
the  provision  of  goods,  facilities  and  services.  Under  the  DDA   1995,   the   functional   equivalent   of   indirect
discrimination is disability-related-discrimination, which is defined as less favourable treatment for a reason related to
a person’s disability, which cannot be justified. The House of Lords undermined two major and established  principles
of disability-related-discrimination. First, for the challenged treatment to be ‘related’ to the  claimant’s  disability,  the
defendant must have known, or ought to have known, of the disability at the time of the treatment. Second,  (Baroness
Hale dissenting) when identifying if the treatment was ‘less favourable’ the correct comparator is a person in the same
circumstances save for the disability. Hence, where a restaurant  has  a  ‘no  dogs’  rule,  the  correct  comparator  is  a
sighted customer with a dog, or where an employer fires a worker who is long-term absent  because  of  his  disability,
the comparator is a worker without a disability who was long-term absent.
FACTS AND DECISION
Courtney Malcolm was diagnosed with schizophrenia. In 2002, he exercised his right to buy his  flat  from  Lewisham
council, but completion was delayed for some time. In May 2004 he lost his job and in June 2004, in contravention  of
his tenancy agreement he sub-let  the  flat  and  moved  out.  Just  after  that,  he  informed  the  council  he  wished  to
complete the transfer on 26 July. It seems his plan was to sub-let after the purchase (which  was  permissible),  but  he
‘jumped the gun’, either because he was unemployed and needed the money, or because  his  judgment  was  impaired
by his schizophrenia. However, on 6 July, the council  discovered  the  sub-letting,  and  gave  him  notice  to  quit,  in
accordance  with  the  tenancy  agreement  and  the  Housing  Act  1985,  section  93,   which   allows   no   discretion.
Subsequently, both Malcolm’s psychiatrist and social worker wrote to council asking for a reprieve  as  they  feared  it
would cause him  another  breakdown.  Nonetheless,  the  council  persisted  and  issued  proceedings  for  possession.
Malcolm claimed his eviction amounted to disability-related-discrimination contrary to the  Disability  Discrimination
Act 1995 (DDA 1995).
At first instance, the County Court trial judge found for the council,  holding  that  Malcolm  did  not  have  a
disability for the purposes of the Act, and that in any  case  the  reason  he  sub-let  early  was  to  raise  money  whilst
unemployed. It was not a mistake caused by his illness. Thus, the eviction did not relate to his disability. The Court of
Appeal reversed [2008] Ch 129, finding that Malcolm’s schizophrenia amounted to a disability and that as  he  sub-let
the  flat  when  his  judgment  was  impaired  by  his  disability,  the  possession  order  was  related  to  his  disability.
Accordingly, he was treated less favourably than a person who did not have schizophrenia and who did not sub-let his
council flat. The House of Lords restored the County Court decision, holding (by a majority) that Malcolm did have  a
disability, but (Baroness Hale dissenting) he was not treated less favourably because the correct the comparator was  a
person without schizophrenia who had also sub-let his council flat  (overruling  Clark  v  Novacold  [1999]  ICR  951,
CA), and in any case (unanimously) the possession order was not related to his disability.
THE ISSUES
The conventional model of indirect discrimination - a facially neutral practice that adversely affects a protected group,
which is not justifiable -  was not employed in the DDA 1995. This is because, in contrast  to  other  protected  groups
such as race or sex, it is unlikely that any facially neutral practice would adversely affect persons with a disability as a
whole group. The assortment of disabilities is too varied for the conventional model. Instead,  in  combination  with  a
duty to make reasonable adjustments (which was not in force for the premises provisions  in  time  for  this  case),  the
Act outlaws ‘disability-related-discrimination.’ This also reflects the position under the long-standing disability law in
the United States, where, in addition to direct discrimination, and a  duty  to  make  ‘reasonable  accommodation’,  the
courts recognise ‘discrimination by proxy’, which is treatment ‘directed at an effect or  manifestation  of  a  handicap’
such as a ‘no wheelchair’ or ‘no dogs’ ban. The courts treat the proxy as a pretext for  direct  discrimination  and  both
carry a justification defence.[i]
               The definition of disability-related-discrimination is substantially the same  for  the  employment  (s  3A(1)),
the provision of goods, facilities and services (‘services’, s 20(1)), and the premises (s 24(1)) parts of the Act,  and  so
this case has implications for the employment and service provisions. Section 24(1) provides:
[A] person . . . discriminates against  a  disabled  person  if  (a)  for  a  reason  which  relates  to  the  disabled
person’s disability, he treats him less favourably than he treats or  would  treat  others  to  whom  that  reason
does not or would not apply; and (b) he cannot show that the treatment in question is justified.
For a prima facie case under (a), there are two elements: the treatment must be for a  reason  ‘related  to’  the  victim’s
disability, and that treatment must be less favourable.
Until Malcolm, the established meaning of these elements was set out in Clark v Novacold [1999]  ICR  951,
at 964-966. The reason for the less favourable treatment need only be related to the disability. Thus if a cafe has a ‘no
dogs’ rule, the reason for refusing entry to a blind man with his guide dog relates to  his  disability  (Minister  of  State
for Social Security and Disabled People, 253 HC Official  Report  (6th  series)  col  150,  24  Jan  1995).  Similarly,  a
disabled customer who is told to leave the restaurant because she has difficulty eating as a result of her disability is so
treated for a reason related to her disability. Accordingly, the  choice  of  comparator  differs  from  that  under  direct
discrimination. In these examples the comparator is a person without the ‘reason’,  ie,  without  a  dog,  or  without  an
eating difficulty. If it were otherwise, and the  comparator  were  a  sighted  man  with  a  dog,  or  a  person  who  had
difficulty eating for a reason unrelated to a disability (say a coughing fit, or because the food tasted awful),  the  scope
of disability-related-discrimination would be drastically reduced, effectively to direct  discrimination.  It  follows  that
the comparison cannot be made until the reason for the treatment is identified, and the comparator is a person  without
that reason.
In Clark v Novacold, Mr Clark suffered a back injury at work which caused  soft  tissue  injuries  around  the
spine. He appeared to be unable to work for at least 12 months, and after four months absence,  he  was  dismissed.  In
response to Clark’s claim for disability-related  discrimination  Novacold  argued  that  it  would  have  dismissed  any
person unable to work for that long. The Court of Appeal held that argument used  the  wrong  comparator.  First,  the
reason for Clark’s  dismissal  was  his  inability  to  work,  which  was  the  ‘reason’  which  related  to  his  disability.
Therefore, the correct comparator should be a worker with neither the  disability  nor  the  ‘reason’,  that  is  a  worker
without his disability and able to work. Speaking for  the  court,  Mummery,  LJ  observed  that  this  approach  would
avoid the problems encountered by the courts in their ‘futile attempts’ to  identify  a  hypothetical  non-pregnant  male
comparator for a pregnant woman in sex discrimination cases before the ECJ decision Webb v EMO  Air  Cargo  Case
C-32/93 [1994] IRLR 482, ECJ. It was also consistent with the availability of the justification  defence  (which  is  not
available  for  direct  discrimination)  which  can  legitimise  an  employer’s  less  favourable  treatment,  where   it   is
proportionate.
The definition was taken a  stage  further  in  Heinz  v  Kendrick  [2000]  ICR  491,  at  §25,  EAT,[ii]  where
Lindsay, J said that there was no need for the defendant to have had knowledge of the  disability.  He  used  two  vivid
examples to illustrate this point. First, a postman with a concealed artificial leg may be dismissed for being  too  slow.
Second, a secretary with undeclared dyslexia may be dismissed for ‘typing hopelessly misspelt letters’.  The  Code  of
Practice supports this view, giving an  example of  a  woman  dismissed  for  persistent  absenteeism  (as  any  worker
would be) where the employer was unaware that the reason for her absence was her multiple sclerosis.[iii] In all  these
examples, the employer’s act amounts to treatment  related  to  the  worker’s  disability  (which  may  or  may  not  be
justified).
The House of Lords in Malcolm disapproved of these principles. Instead, for the treatment to be  ‘related’  to
the claimant’s disability, the defendant must have known, or ought to have known, of the disability at the time  of  the
treatment (Lords Bingham (§ 18), Scott (§ 29), Neuberger (§ 163), Baroness Hale (§ 86)). Lord Scott appeared to go a
step further, holding that the defendant must have been ‘motivated’ by the disability (§ 29). Further, for identifying  if
the treatment was ‘less favourable’ the  correct  comparator  was  a  person  in  the  same  circumstances  save  for  the
disability. Hence, in the examples above, the correct comparator is a sighted customer with a dog, a person  without  a
disability but with eating difficulties, or a worker without a disability who was long-term absent. This  reverses  Clark
v Novacold.[iv] Baroness Hale dissented on this point.[v]
COMMENT
Malcolm’s case actually turned on the  finding  of  fact  by  the  trial  judge  that  the  sub-letting  was  not  a  result  of
Malcolm’s illness. However, the Law  Lords’  wider  remarks  on  disability-related  discrimination  deserve  attention
because they overruled the long-established Clark v Novacold, and applied not only to the housing  provisions  of  the
DDA 1995, but also those covering employment, and the provision of goods, facilities and services.
Knowledge of the Disability
The notion that the defendant must have had knowledge of the disability when acting is at  odds  with  the  concept  of
indirect discrimination. This is all more so when demanding, as Lord Scott alone did, that the disability motivated  the
treatment. The concept of indirect discrimination is concerned with the impact of facially neutral conduct, rather  than
the state of mind of the defendant. The notion that an  employer  can  discriminate  ‘blind’  is  well  established.  Most
typically, studies of entrance exams can reveal an adverse impact on a  particular  protected  group  (see  eg  Bushey  v
New  York  State  Civil  Service   Commission   733   F   2d   220   (2nd   Cir   1984)[vi]).   In   Price   v   Civil   Service
Commission [1978] ICR 27 EAT, the employer’s age limit  of  17-27  adversely  affected  women  because  of  family
responsibilities. In Falkirk Council v Whyte [1997] IRLR 560 EAT,  the employer’s selection criterion,  ‘management
training and supervisory experience’, adversely affected women, whilst the ‘no beards’ policy in Panesar v Nestle  Co
Ltd [1980] ICR 144 CA adversely affected orthodox Sikhs.  In  none  of  these  cases  could  it  be  suggested  that  for
liability the employer should have been aware of the discriminatory impact of its practice.
A requirement of knowledge reduces the reach of disability-related-discrimination to less than that  provided
by direct discrimination, where it is  possible  for  an  employer  to  directly  discriminate  without  knowledge  of  the
victim’s disability. For instance, the employer may advertise internally for a  promotion,  stating  that  the  post  is  not
suitable for anyone with a history of mental illness, and exclude, unknowingly, a member  of  staff  with  a  history  of
schizophrenia (see the Code of Practice  § 4.11).[vii] This principle holds at EC level, where  public  statements  by  a
director that he would not employ immigrants was held to be direct racial discrimination: Feryn Case C-54/07  (2008)
ECJ. Further, it had been thought  possible  for  the  employer  to  directly  discriminate  by  acting  on  discriminatory
factors of which  it  is  unaware.  In  Williams  v  YKK  EAT/0408/01  AM  Elias,  J  (§  32)  suggested  obiter  that  an
unprejudiced manager’s decision may be affected, or tainted, by a  report  made  by  a  prejudiced  supervisor.  So  for
instance, a manager who is unaware that a worker’s  absenteeism  was  due  to  her  disability,  may  be  influenced  to
dismiss her by unfavourable opinions delivered by prejudiced colleagues who were  aware  of  her  disability.  This  is
direct discrimination because the  reason  for  the  treatment  is  the  victim’s  disability:  the  basis  of  the  prejudiced
opinions was disability, rather than absenteeism. This is known and established in the  United  States  as  ‘Cat’s  Paw’
theory.[viii] The feature of this theory is that the prejudiced subordinate has influence over the decision-maker and  so
‘poisons the well’[ix] from which that decision-maker draws his knowledge.
               Lord Bingham (§ 18) and Baroness Hale (§ 86) considered that as disability-related-discrimination  carries  a
justification defence, knowledge must be an element, otherwise the defendant would be in  no  position  to  justify  the
challenged treatment. Once again, this overlooks the  basic  tenets  of  indirect  discrimination  theory.  In  any  of  the
examples above, it is perfectly possible that the employer had a justifiable reason for its  challenged  practice  without
being aware of the adverse impact on a protected group. Once  it  becomes  aware  (say  at  the  start  of  the  litigation
process) it would have to concede its case or argue it on  its  merits.  In  the  context  of  housing,  a  landlord  without
knowledge of his tenants’ mental illness could justify evicting them for causing a nuisance to  their  neighbours,  even
though their behaviour was caused by the mental illness (Manchester City Council  v  Romano  [2005]  1  WLR  2775
CA). The landlord’s justification stands to be judged whether or not he knew of the disability.
               The demand for knowledge is undermined further by considering how the justification defence relates to  the
duty to make reasonable adjustments. The DDA 1995 states that where there is duty to make  reasonable  adjustments,
disability-related-discrimination cannot be justified until that duty is met. In some fields (employment and -  since  the
Malcolm case arose - premises) the duty cannot arise until the defendant is aware (or ought to have been aware) of the
disability. Hence, in these fields disability-related-discrimination is only likely to be justified where no  duty  to  make
adjustments arises, in other words, when the defendant has no knowledge of the  disability.  The  conclusion  must  be
that the Act envisages that the  justification  defence  to  disability-related-discrimination  can  be  invoked  where  the
defendant had no knowledge of the disability.[x]
               Lords Scott (§ 28), Bingham  (§  18)  and  Neuberger  (§  162)  related  their  opinion  to  the  availability  of
damages. For instance, Lord Neuberger observed:
...  it  would  require  very  clear  words  before  a  statute  could  render  a  person  liable   for   damages   for
discrimination against a disabled person, owing to an act which was not inherently discriminatory carried out
at a time when the person had no reason to know of the disability which could render the act discriminatory.
This implies that the Lords are looking for fault liability. The use of the phrase  ‘inherently  discriminatory’  augments
this  view.  The  history  of  Britain’s  discrimination  legislation  points  to  a   different   conclusion.   Both   the   Sex
Discrimination Act 1975 and Race Relations Act 1976 originally provided that for indirect discrimination no damages
shall be awarded where it was unintentional.[xi] However, it became clear that this restriction did not comply with EC
law. In Draehmpaehl v Urania Immobilien Service ohg Case C-180/95 [1997] IRLR 538, the ECJ held that a Member
State may not make an award of compensation in a sex discrimination case dependent on showing fault on the part  of
the employer. Consequently, the restriction was dropped and cannot apply to any case falling under  Equal  Treatment
(sex), Race, or Framework (sexual orientation, religion or belief, age, and disability) Directives.[xii]  The  DDA  1995
provides, like the other  statutes,  that  damages  may  be  awarded  when  a  court  or  tribunal  considers  it  ‘just  and
equitable’ (s 17A(2)). It makes no distinction between employment (covered by the Directive) and  other  matters  and
so apparently has the same meaning for all areas covered. As such, it must be read to comply with  the  Directive,  and
this means that damages cannot be dependant upon fault.
               The demand for knowledge or fault based liability is  at  odds  the  principle  of  indirect  discrimination  and
prevailing  EC  law,  as  well  as  the  relationship  between  disability-related-discrimination  and  the  duty  to   make
reasonable adjustments,
The Comparator
The device used to identify if the treatment was less favourable is a comparison, a matter ‘fundamental to the  concept
of discrimination which underlies the whole of the DDA’ (Baroness Hale § 69). Technically speaking, the problem  is
whether the ‘reason’ (for the treatment) at the beginning section 24 is the same reason at the end  (‘he  treats  him  less
favourably than he ... would treat others to whom that  reason  ....  would  not  apply  ...  ’  ).  The  wide  interpretation
supposes that the comparator is not endowed with the ‘reason’ for the treatment.
The majority’s technical argument was that the wide  interpretation  would  mean  that  Malcolm’s  treatment
would be compared with a tenant who had not sub-let. It would also mean that  a  worker  off  sick  for  a  long  period
because of his disability would be compared to a non-disabled worker not off sick. Of course, the  council  would  not
evict this tenant nor would the employer dismiss this worker. As  such,  this  test  ‘would  always  be  met’[xiii]and  is
therefore ‘pointless’.[xiv] Lord Scott concluded: ‘Parliament must surely have  intended  the  comparison  ....  to  be  a
meaningful comparison in order to distinguish  between  treatment  that  was  discriminatory  and  treatment  that  was
not’.[xv]
This logic enabled the Lords to attack the examples given in Clark v Novacold. Lord Bingham  said  that,  ‘A
more natural comparison ...  would fall to be made ... with a person who had a dog but  no  disability  or  a  diner  who
was a very untidy eater but had no disability-related reason for eating in that  way.’[xvi]  Lords  Scott  and  Neuberger
agreed that a blind person with a dog should  be  compared  to  a  sighted  person  with  a  dog,[xvii]  with  Lord  Scott
labelling this the ‘common sense’ answer.[xviii]
However,  to  call  the  wider  comparison  ‘pointless’  lacks  imagination.   For   example,   using   the   wide
interpretation, the comparator could be a tenant who is being evicted, along  with  the  claimant,  because  the  council
wish to refurbish their block of flats, or perhaps demolish it  because  it  has  been  condemned  unsafe.  An  ‘eviction’
could be part of re-housing programme. Similarly, the comparator worker may be dismissed, not because of his  long-
term absence, but because the whole workforce (or a section of it), including the claimant, is  being  made  redundant.
In either case, this comparison reveals the treatment was not related to the claimant’s disability.  As  such,  this  wider
comparison will not ‘always be met’ and is not pointless.
As disability-related-discrimination (along with the reasonable adjustments duty) is the functional equivalent
of indirect discrimination, applying  the  majority’s  logic  to  a  classic  case  of  indirect  discrimination  exposes  the
inadequacy of the narrow comparator. Suppose entrance exams were challenged as disfavouring black applicants. The
‘reason’  for  their  non-selection  is  the  failure  of  the  exam.  The  correct  comparator  group  would  be  the  white
applicants, without that reason, in other words all the  white  applicants.  Where  a  significantly  lower  proportion  of
black, than white, applicants passes the exam, a prima facie case  is  made.  If  the  ‘narrow  comparator’  theory  were
applied here, the comparator group would be exactly the same as the claimant group, save for race. In other  words,  it
would include the ‘reason’ and so consist only of whites who did not pass  the  exam.  Of  course,  no  adverse  impact
would be revealed. This would be a ‘pointless’ comparison as it would reveal nothing about the  impact  of  the  exam
on black and white applicants. For disability-related-discrimination, the narrow comparison is equally pointless,  as  it
would reveal nothing about the impact of the employer’s policy on the person with a disability.
The difference for disability-related-discrimination is that the claimant’s group consists only  of  one  person,
and this may have led to the mistake. Where the claimant’s group contains all  of  those  who  took  the  exam,  it  will
comprise,  normally,  some  who  failed  and  some  who  passed.  The  ‘natural’  or  ‘common  sense’   (and   correct)
comparator group of white candidates will contain also some who failed and some who passed. For  disability-related-
discrimination, the claimant’s ‘group’ will consist of one person, and so 100% of  this  ‘group’  are  disadvantaged  by
the practice. Thus, it is tempting to project the claimant’s  identity  minus  only  his  disability  onto  the  comparator’s
‘group’ (of one), which in Malcolm, would be a person who also sub-let. This is the mistake. In the rare  conventional
indirect discrimination cases where 100% of the claimant’s group are disadvantaged by the practice, the  comparator’s
group still discards the ‘reason’. In Greencroft  Social  Club  v  Mullen  [1985]  ICR  796  EAT,  only  members  were
entitled to a disciplinary hearing. Women were not admitted as members, so the proportion of women  not  entitled  to
membership or the disciplinary hearing was 100%. Nonetheless, the  EAT  found  that  a  prima  facie  case  had  been
made. If the Malcolm logic were projected onto this case, the comparator group would be men who were not members
(the ‘reason’), an absurd and pointless comparison.
In addition, as Baroness Hale explained in her dissent on this issue,[xix] the legislative  history  supports  the
wider interpretation. When introduced, the Disability Discrimination Bill provided that the comparison should be with
‘others who do not have that disability’ (clause 4(1)(a)). Then the Government replaced this with the words ‘to  whom
that  reason  does  not  or  would  not  apply’  in  what  became  section  5(1)(a)  (employment)  and  section   24(1)(a)
(services), and ‘others to whom that reason does not or would not apply’ in what became section 20(1)(a)  (premises).
When introducing these amendments, the Government explained it now meant that a job applicant who could not type
because of arthritis should now be compared with a job applicant who could type, rather than an  applicant  without  a
disability who could not type. Such a case should turn on justification, not the comparison.[xx]
Baroness Hale then pointed to subsequent amendments made to the  employment  provisions  (to  implement
the Framework Directive 2000/78/EC), on the basis that Novacold was correct. The Government introduced a specific
definition of direct discrimination which was not justifiable to run  alongside  disability-related-discrimination,  which
is justifiable (respectively ss 3A(5), 3A(1), DDA 1995).[xxi] As  the  narrow  construction  reduces  disability-related-
discrimination to direct discrimination,[xxii] it must be incorrect, otherwise  the  section  providing  disability-related-
discrimination would be redundant.
Policy Considerations
Underpinning the majority speeches on both elements was concern for the limited housing stock and  waiting  lists  (§
9), and the difficult position of Lewisham council, who might well have  faced  judicial  review  had  it  not  evicted  a
tenant who was sub-letting (§§ 8, 90). Moreover, there was concern for the  position  of  landlords,  public  or  private,
who may never be able to evict a disabled tenant, who, for instance, permanently sub-let, or never  paid  any  rent  (§§
29,  102,  158).  Clearly,  the  Law  Lords  were  afraid,  as  Lord   Neuberger   put   it,   of   giving   disability-related-
discrimination ‘extraordinarily far-reaching scope’.[xxiii]
These concerns miss the true problem, which is the limited justification defence for premises  (and  services).
In the field  of  premises,  disability-related-discrimination  justification  is  limited  to  an  exhaustive  list  of  specific
conditions, such as to avoid endangering the health or safety of any  person,  or  that  the  person  with  a  disability  is
incapable of entering into an enforceable agreement (s 24(3)). None of these conditions covers sub-letting or the  non-
payment of rent. Thus, if for a reason related to his disability a tenant permanently sub-lets, or fails to pay any rent, he
could never be evicted. This contrasts with the employment field, where the grounds of  justification  are  unrestricted
and amenable to a whole range of circumstances. As Baroness Hale explained (§ 80), ‘It may well be  that  Parliament
had not understood that the narrow scope for justification in relation to services and premises would  give  rise  to  the
problems we face in this case.’
But there are some worrying trends underlying in these speeches. First, the majority’s narrow construction of
the comparison reveals  a  fear  of  apparently  treating  Malcolm  more  favourably  than  other  tenants  who  sub-let.
Meanwhile, Lord Brown observed that the duty to make reasonable  adjustments  arises  because,  ‘The  needs  of  the
disabled are rather different and require sometimes to be met by positive action.’[xxiv] This suggests  the  judges  are
rooted  in  some  ‘common  sense’  or  ‘natural’  notion  of  discrimination  law,[xxv]  where  anything  beyond  equal
treatment  is  positive  discrimination  and   undesirable.   This   misunderstands   the   purpose   of   disability-related-
discrimination and the reasonable adjustments duty, which is to encourage different action so people ‘can play  as  full
as possible a part in society whatever their disabilities.’[xxvi]
The other underlying trend is the judges’ fear of liability without knowledge. Again, to assume that a  person
cannot  discriminate  without  knowing  misunderstands  the  purpose  of  discrimination  law  generally,  and  indirect
discrimination and disability-related-discrimination in particular, which  is  more  concerned  with  the  discriminatory
effect of a person’s act, rather than his state of mind. This drift towards fault-based liability was  apparent  also  in  the
House of Lords’ speeches in the victimisation case Chief Constable of West Yorks v Khan [2001] 1 WLR 1947,[xxvii]
where they devised an honest and reasonable benign motive defence, and the direct discrimination case of Shamoon v
RUC [2003] ICR 337, where they replaced the but for test with the but why? question.[xxviii]
CONCLUSION
The House of Lords could have resolved this case much more simply, either by sending it back to a tribunal to  decide
if the eviction was related to Malcolm’s disability, this  time  on  the  basis  that  Malcolm  had  a  disability,  or  more
simply, on the trial judge’s finding that the premature sub-letting was not a result of Malcolm’s illness. In either  case,
it should have warned Parliament of the dangers  associated  with  the  narrow  justification  defence  in  the  fields  of
premises (and services), which, as Baroness Hale accepted (§ 102), may  interfere  with  a  landlord’s  property  rights
under the European Convention on Human Rights (1st protocol, art 1).
               Instead, with its requirement for ‘knowledge’ and a narrow  comparison,  the  House  of  Lords  has  reduced
disability-related-discrimination  to  something  less  than  direct  discrimination,   and   imposed   this   view   on   the
employment provisions.[xxix] As such, this judgment makes an unnecessary challenge to the  EC  discrimination  law
principles that knowledge is not necessary for liability and that disability law must provide for indirect discrimination.
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